

BRAZILIAN & VENEZUELAN BRIEFINGS AGENDA

April 1979

- A. PRC-VN-USSR
- B. PLO
- C. Rhodesia
- D. Angola
- E. Cubans in Africa

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- F. Nicaragua - in your [REDACTED]
- G. Portugal - only in your notebook

*Note-taking notebooks are in all  
the handout notebooks*

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1230, 17 Apr 79

# CHINA-VN-USSR TRIANGLE & US POLICY

## Retrospective

### I. Assess each in relation to Indochina situation

#### A. Vietnam - losers?

- over-extended militarily - 2 fronts
- distress economically
- reputation as aggressors in Kampuchea
- regarded by ASEAN as threat
- Set VN back: Sov. can't be counted on totally  
however not prepared to accept they are one down

#### B. Soviet Union

- did receive some credit, esp. in Eur.; Eur. feels Sov behaved correctly

##### 1. avoided direct involvement - statesmanlike

- but in Asian eyes may have suffered net minus

##### 1. In ties w/VN -

##### 2. failed to deter Chinese

##### 3. apprehensive about naval & air presence

(Photo: First Soviet ships in VN)

#### C. China

Must view as net plus - primary objective

##### 1. Handled adroitly - signaled intent

- a. pol. objectives transcended scope of mil. objectives
- b. so doing, skillfully controlled their risks

- whether mil. performance restrained entirely because of limited objectives or because of heavy casualties unclear (tens of thousands on both sides)

##### 2. Dispelled image of China as "paper tiger"

- China did cross international boundaries
- China initially criticized for attacking but after w/drawal criticism reduced  
but Chinese credited for exercising forbearance

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TAB A

(Photos: Pre-invasion  
Inset Map w/current  
positions)

3. Shown ASEAN - VN not as big a threat as thought
4. Showed US/West USSR is paper tiger
5. Secondary objective - easing pressure on beleaguered  
Kampuchea  
-succeeded in short term

30,000 VN troops w/drawn

## II. Short-term policies

Presently not much room for political compromise - although talks  
start 14 April

- A. Vietnamese still building up bargaining position & make more  
difficult for Chinese to attack again

(Kam-VN Mil Force  
Map)

1. -VN movement of forces to north to improve bargaining position  
100-200,000 in Hanoi-border area now  
vice 70,000 in Dec.  
-Also continued mobilization

Econ. cost; pressing Sov. for material assistance

VN has little chance of becoming self-sufficient in  
food under prevailing conditions

In better position now in Kampuchea than a few weeks ago  
but has still not gained countryside

### 2. VN-Soviet

- Recent activity: 25 Mar. began Sov airlift of multi-division  
force to west/southwest Kampuchea
- considerable gamble; VN already down road of getting bogged  
down in guerrilla war
- This could involve Sov reputation since ID w/VN but Sov.  
dilemma, no other alternative at this moment
- Initial success - ?? But will mean a long-term involvement in  
Kampuchea
- VN unlikely get into such close relationship w/Sov as would  
be necessary for major support
- Try to restrict Sov presence, e.g. via base rights

### 3. VN-Beijing

- Preempt another attack w/negot.
- Wants to go into negotiations with best strength - reparations
- Avoid overcommitment w/Soviets
- Reduces pressure fr/ASEAN, & elsewhere for Kampuchean aggression

## 4. VN-others?

Possibly Japan - supplement Sov. aid  
Put itself in better light with Asia & West

## B. China

## 1. Maintains mil. forces along VN border by large margin

(Mil. Forces along  
Sino-VN Border Map)

-400,000 troops to 200,000 but intended also to tie down VN main  
forces & maximize mil. & econ. strain on VN  
-Will take time

(Photo: Chinese Arms  
Ship. to Cambodia)

## 2. Sustain Kampuchean resistance

-Looks like Pol Pot may survive until rainy season but in  
weakened state  
-Worse thing in store in Kampuchea may be famine

## 3. Indicated willingness internat conf

## III. Longer term outlook

Much depends on how well Kampuchea resistance holds up

-If VN take over - stiffen both sides  
-If standoff in Kampuchea will make talks more meaningful in time  
-Everyone may be amenable to some compromise formula

## A. Vietnam

If difficulties increase may modify Kampuchean policy -  
Accept something less than originally desired - set back timetable

-may settle for "united front" w/other elements besides Heng  
Samrin

Only other solution turn to Soviets for mil. assistance but unlikely;  
contrary to strong VN nationalism & Sov may not be willing

## B. China

Also indications some coalition solution in mind

Sihanouk possibility

But how push Pol Pot into background?

Effective leader

## 1. Drive VN into greater dependence on Sov

-lead to tension & resentment  
turn VN into more balanced course

C. Soviets - in dilemma: Want world (especially ASEAN) to view China as one to fear but if VN aggressor, and Sov. is VN ally caught between aiding VN, alienating ASEAN, thus shifting view of China threat to that of VN.

1. Probably willing to accept "coalition gov't" in Kampuchea

-May help move VN to political settlement but would not press them

-May accept Sihanouk if removed from Beijing  
(Kriangsak report on shift)

-cautious in mil. presence, ships not permanent in Cam Ranh Bay

(Photo: Sov. ships  
in Cam Ranh Bay)

(Sov. Strategic  
Force Deployment  
Map -  
SS-20 Photo)

2. Strengthen position vis-a-vis Beijing independently of VN,  
i.e. Sino-Soviet border

IV. Next stage & relationship to US policy

A. Most desirable both for Asia & US: neutralize Kampuchea

B. Reduce threat of VN

want stable, peaceful region

remove VN as servant of Soviet interests

VN must realize ambitious objectives cannot be realized -  
Accept something less

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1245, 16 Apr 79

ANGOLA

I. Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) with a force of about 18,000 men continues its guerrilla war.

A. Use hit-and-run raids against

- military targets
- transportation links
- occasionally villages friendly to Neto's government

(Insurgency  
Map)

B. Operates freely over large part of southern Angola

- But doesn't attempt to hold towns or territory
- Engages in pitched battle only rarely

C. Savimbi's objective is

- to force Neto recognize his claim to participate in the Angolan government
- by tying up government forces and resources, and demonstrating Neto's inability to govern alone
- while maintaining a high profile for UNITA.

D. Savimbi has set the withdrawal of the 20,000 Cuban soldiers fighting for Neto as a precondition for negotiations.

II. Neto's government remains dependent on the Soviets and Cubans.

(Cuban  
Garrison Photo)

A. He believes that the Cubans must stay, operating from garrisons like this.

- Not only because of UNITA
- But because of South African threat

B. However, he is disappointed by the failure of Cuban defenses to detect or deter South African and Rhodesian raids.

- The Cubans did not acquit themselves well against the South Africans when they fought two years ago.

C. Furthermore there are signs of friction

1. Soviets and Cubans appear to be bartering technical advice and military equipment for Angolan exports that they resell advantageously on the world market.
2. Angolans accuse Soviets of overfishing Angolan waters.



## 3. Cubans

- Preempt or steal scarce consumer goods for their own use
- Strip areas they occupy of valuables & ship them home.

## III. Neto is also trying to mend his fences with the rest of the world.

A. He has improved relations with Portugal, France and China

B. Relations with Zaire continue to improve

1. Mobuto & Neto are cooperating on border security & other matters of mutual interest

- e.g. repatriating tens of thousands of refugees

2. Neither is capable of fully controlling his border areas,

- e.g. anti-Mobuto dissidents remain in northern Angola
- If and when Inter-African Force departs Shaba, new incursions could take place.
- But now without Angolan or Cuban complicity

3. A major current issue is the Benguela railroad

- Reopening attempted 14 April
- Planned to send out a Shaba ore shipment
- But UNITA apparently kept closed

C. The Soviets do not appear to be opposing these Neto moves

1. It may be they approve because this would ease the economic burdens on the USSR in the long term.

2. Angola does face many problems that won't be quickly solved

- Food shortages, transport failures and lack of trained manpower are major problems
- Oil from Cabinda is Angola's principal earner of foreign exchange.

D. Neto's major hopes in all of this are

1. To secure his northern and southern borders so he can work unhindered inside Angola
2. In particular, to cut down on outside support to UNITA
  - This has Savimbi worried
3. And to ease his economic problems.

## IV. For the long term

A. We expect Neto to remain in control of the Angolan government

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- Although one can never totally discount a major threat developing out of some combination of Angola's deep
  - ethnic and ideological cleavages
  - military struggles
  - economic problems

B. Even with outside support withering, we expect UNITA can hold out for years.

- So this struggle will go on for the foreseeable future'
- Except in the very unlikely case that Neto & Savimbi decide to negotiate.

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1800, 16 Apr 79

## CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

I. Cuban involvement cannot be seen properly outside the context of Soviet motivations.

A. The Soviets still see Africa as the most fertile field for, asserting themselves. They are driven to this by

1. Ideology reasons

- Their ideology carries with it the view that the world should be in the Soviet mold
- Also, supporting revolution abroad helps legitimize their own oppressive rule in the USSR as an essential part of world revolution.

2. Geopolitical/strategic reasons, grasping what they see as prerogatives of a great power.

- a. Africa seen as the world's most volatile area, many opportunities for Soviets to exploit
- b. Respond in Africa to Arabs constricting USSR influence in Mideast.
- c. Secure bases and support facilities, e.g. Soviets are expanding their use of naval facilities on Dahlak island off Ethiopian coast.

(Dahlak Map)

B. Cubans see Africa as fertile too

1. Primary Motives are

- a. Zeal for what Castro calls "proletarian internationalism"
- b. Self assertion by expanding his own role in the world
- c. Africa attractive after long history of failure of guerrilla war in Latin America

(Econ Support Graphic)

2. Dependence on USSR -

- a. Castro recognizes Cuba is important, but not vital to USSR
- b. He hopes service in Africa gives him more leverage & flexibility with USSR

- C. Happy coincidence for them that use of Cuban proxies has muted African reactions to Soviet incursions

II. The record shows increasing Cuban penetrations

- (Cuban Diplomatic Presence) A. Diplomatic and civilian  
(Cuban Military Presence) B. Military

- C. Most dramatic cases, of course, are

- Angola & Ethiopia where mil. presence has been there for sometime
- Rhodesia - possible future Cuban involvement

(Cuban Congo Camp Photo)

- D. But we see military presence in such places as the Congo too. (300 training but 2-3000 stationed, dealing w/staging base; aimed at Cabinda)

III. In Ethiopia the Soviets and Cubans continue to support Mengistu

- A. Insurgencies continue in both Eritrea and the Ogaden

1. In Eritrea

(Eritrea Map)

- Cubans and Soviets acted primarily as advisors
- The Eritrean guerrillas have had serious military reverses
- Guerrilla unity remains elusive
- But they seem capable of holding out indefinitely in the hills

(Cuban Forces Photos)

2. In the Ogaden

- Three Cuban brigades continue to operate against Somali insurgents as they have for months.
- Guerrillas continue hit and run raids and sabotage of Djibouti to Addis Ababa railroad
- Show every sign of being able to continue indefinitely

(Ethnic Map of the Horn)

3. So low-level insurgency will continue to be in the order of things in both Eritrea and the Ogaden indefinitely based on age-old animosities arising from ethnic differences.

- B. However, Mengistu has consolidated his own position in Addis Ababa

1. And we see him shifting his emphasis to economic development

2. This will present new opportunities for frictions with Soviets and Cubans

- Even when they needed military help the most, Ethiopians were privately critical of Soviet disinterest in economics
- Mengistu got some Soviet aid commitments in November, but
- Soviet aid record suggests Moscow's performance will fall short of Ethiopian hopes

C. We're not predicting a falling-out,

1. Mengistu's need for military help will continue
2. However, typically African interest in the Soviets and Cubans is
  - directly proportional to their interest in fighting
  - inversely proportional to their interest in economic development

IV. There's another story woven into this. It has to do with Cuba's activities in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations (UN)

- A. Cuba will be the next President in Office of the NAM and is attempting to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council
- B. Castro sees NAM leadership and the chance for UN Security Council seat in terms of
  1. Prestige - He relishes the opportunity to assume a high profile on the world stage.
  2. Practicality - These positions will provide him additional leverage on the Soviets
  3. So again we see an interaction of Castro's ambitions and his need to gain elbow room in his dependence on the USSR.
- C. The NAM President in Office is more than ceremonial because organizational mechanisms give levers of power to the leader who
  1. Can write the first draft of papers to be considered at ministerial and heads of state meetings.
  2. Influences what appears on meeting agendas and the emphasis given to each topic
    - The issues addressed by the NAM change little over time, but
    - The emphasis varies greatly among meetings.
  3. Drafts the final communiques of meetings
  4. Determines what issues are pursued vigorously and which are neglected between meetings.
- D. Cuba's role as NAM President in Office will be a function of the interaction of Castro's goals and his ability to use these levers of power.

- Much more than Sri Lanka & even more than Algeria
- Cubans have been around the world seeking commitments to high level attendance at Havana

1. Castro will focus more on political issues than economic because

- The Group of 77 is now the principal economic forum for members of the NAM
- Cuba's goals are largely political
- Expect Castro will use NAM organs at the UN to push his favorite issues in both organizations.

2. We expect anti-Egypt-US-Israel rhetoric emerging from Baghdad to be

- echoed in Colombo
- and shouted in Havana

3. The Havana Summit will be very acerbic

- a. But Castro's ability to swing it completely has limits.
- b. Consensus is the glue that holds the NAM together

(1) Castro recognizes this

- He was burned badly at Algiers in 1973.
- Seems to be proceeding carefully
- For example at Maputo in February Cuba wrote "Letter of Concern" on the Kampuchean delegation rather than a "Formal Reservation" as did Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Laos & Congo.

(2) Soviets recognize this too, so Castro can plead the overriding need to appear as a responsible, conciliatory NAM leader to give himself a little room for independence from the Soviet line.

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1745, 16 Apr 79

## NICARAGUA

Continued violence

Major Sandinista guerrilla attacks in early April

But unless Somoza weakens & physically removed (both unlikely)

> 50% chance of finishing term in '81

Given edge because

- National Guards increased capabilities
- support in C. Amer.
- ineffectiveness of moderate opposition
- inability of radical & moderate forces

### I. Somoza initiated reform proposal in Congress in early Mar

- To better image
- Quiet pol. situation
- Undercut opponents

#### A. Most of opposition reacted w/disinterest or distrust

- No opposition element risks being charged as collaborationist

### II. Sandinistas

#### A. Increased firepower & capabilities

First successful use of machine guns for first time against Nic. planes

Total forces claimed at 5000

CIA believes 2000 plus

But capable of spectacular operations & protracted fighting

#### B. 3 principal factions met in Havana in early Mar

- Established combined national directorate
- Elusive unity??
- United goal of nat. insurrection
- Past unity efforts sponsored by Cubans not lasting
- Castro counseled FSLN not to push installation of Marxist gov't - work to limited objective of removal of Somoza and for future influence

### III. Nat. Guard - Somoza's principle

- Also strengthened  
fr 8000 to 11,000 since last Sept.
- Greater counterinsurgency
- Guard morale reasonably hi
- Guard determined to exterminate guerrillas; remain behind Somoza until term ends
- Potential problem could be funding/salaries of guard

IV. Sandinistas vs. Nat. Guard

- Guard
- More, better trained, firmer logistics base
  - Has clear edge
  - Inflicts greater casualties
  - FSLN lacks organization, could be more effective in coordinated attacks
  - In recent fighting in Esteli FSLN can't seem to pick up civilian opposition to Guard  
(can't translate anti-Somoza to anti-gov't.)

V. Moderate Opposition

- Not effective
  - Immobilized by failure of US-led mediation effort
  - Grudging acceptance Somoza will end term
  - Tactics of general strike - did not work
  - With Nat. Guard & guerrillas fighting - Moderates have no real role: recognize losing whatever political relevancy they had
1. Caught between extremes
  2. Fearful, uneasy
  3. Leaders have no strategy

VI. Economy

- A. Arrested growth  
'73-'77 GDP grew ~ 6.8%/yr.  
In '78 fell by 3%  
'79 doesn't look good  
In default on \$88M to foreign, mainly US, w/IMF  
Unpopular steps needed  
Can Somoza carry them out?
- B. De-evaluation of "Cordoba" last week
- C. Performance in '79 dependent on
- Cotton & coffee planting - disrupted by pol. situation?
  - Enforcement of austerity program
- D. Population growth 3.2%/yr.  
If economy stagnates  
GDP/capital combined w/pop. growth could drop by 12%

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## PORTUGAL

### I. Portuguese Pol. Situation

Prime Minister ~~Mota~~ Pinto:

stern econ. stands  
abrasive pol. style

(Portugal's Party)  
Strength)

both contributing to shift in public mood  
allowing those on left to regain offensive

e.g. budget vote in early Mar proposed higher taxes and continued  
wage constraints

-narrowly defeated Social Democrats (center right) and Socialists  
(center left) abstained; allowed Comm & their allies to  
outvote gov't supported by conservative Center Democrats

but 37 of 73 Social Democrats rejected party leaders' Carneiro  
decision to abstain rather than support gov't budget

(Party Split  
Chart)

Split means Pinto may get slightly revised version thru legisla  
and short-term position of Pinto enhanced

Party dissidents object to Carneiro's political maneuvering, shifts  
in position over interests of nation (economic recovery)

Other independents & Center Democrats could link in a pro-Pinto  
alliance

Pinto could then be defeated only if Socialists or Carneiro's  
followers vote against him.

Since last fall when

Socialists & Center Democrats forced Costa fr office after their  
own attempt at coalition rule - public opinion & support down  
Socialist still not recovered

Long-term - deeper uncertainty with current activity centering on  
formation of new political movements

### II. Pinto's tenure

#### A. Current attitude

-strongly negative  
-not there because parliamentary majority support policies  
-but because parties comprising majority intimidated

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## B. Eanes - key to Pinto's survival

- embodies countries anti-party feeling; appeal as a Centrist
- but intervenes too unpredictably; distances himself from parties
- thereby allows weaknesses to be exposed
- if identified w/Pinto will hurt

1. lose workers
2. other leftist constituencies

## C. Any successor will have shaky hold on power

## III. Economy

(Per Capita GDP  
'78 Chart)A. E.C. Membership Negotiations ongoing, entry expected as early as '82  
problems will be economic development

EC Portugal's largest market

(Trade w/EC,  
'77 Chart)

Between '70 & '77 trade w/EC nine nearly tripled - accounted for  
 52% of exports }  
 44% of imports } in '77

Short-term gain: inflows of EC funds

Long-term: potential for modernizing, competition

B. Continuing problem - structural weakness of industrial sector  
small, labor-intensive firms vs. large capital  
intensive nationalized companies

Risks of EC nine competition may cause

- econ. dislocation
- unemployment

More important industries:

textile, steel, shipbuilding,

- suffering fr worldwide overcapacity
- growing competition fr LDCs
- and EC has imposed trade quotas on steel & quotas on textiles;  
price floors on members

Other problems:

- underinvestment in human capital plant & equip.
- drop in private investment
- poor distribution of investment

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C. Agriculture

Impact of higher EC prices on buyers of cereals & grains

Portuguese agric. yields - lowest in Europe; higher EC prices should induce more production

D. Labor

jobless at least 465,000

many young

EC fears will join 800,000 workers & 200,000 dependents already in EC nine when joblessness above normal everywhere

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